16 October 2015
Inconsistent investigation of MH17
Inconsistent investigation of MH17
By: Karsten Riise
The Netherlands do not deliver, what the public deserves.
The Research Question
On 17 July 2014, civil airplane MH-17 crashed in Eastern Ukrane.
The question for the investigation committee is: How did that happen?
Two Possible Theories
Already the Preliminary report provided evidence that the crash of MH-17 was not a normal accident – the MH-17 was shot down.
There are two possible theories:
- The MH-17 was shot down by
an surface-to-air Buk missile.
Buk missiles have been deployed by rebels in Eastern Ukraine – but a Buk missile could also have been fired by forces loyal to the current Ukrainian government. - The MH-17 was shot down by
military fighter aircraft from Ukraine by one - or two (!) air-to-air
missile with a warhead big enough to simulate the warhead of a Buk
missile.
Attack by military aircraft may have been preceded by machine gun fire against the pilot cockpit.
A report from the think-tank Australian Air Power 2012.04 (attached) on Russian air-to-air missiles demonstrates that an endless variety of air-to-air missiles exists that could be available to the Ukrainian air force. Several of these may in size and blast pattern be similar to a Buk surface-to-air missile. A missile blast is itself only with difficulty to be established whether it comes from a surface-to-air missile or from a big air-to-air missile the same size and type: From this aspect theory A and B can deliver very much the same resulting facts to the investigation.
The “truth early propagated by official media from nearly all NATO and EU countries was theory A. However, though the rebels in East Ukraine may not be perfectly competent in using the Buk missile system, they do not have any motive to target a foreign civilian aircraft. The Ukrainian government was at the time of MH-17 in dire need of international support, and with the shoot-down of MH-17 the Ukrainian has won decisive propaganda advantages and garnered unprecedented support from USA and EU. The tragic event of MH-17 was really a turning point for the new Ukrainian government in getting international (Western) support.
The Ukrainian government has all the military means to shoot down MH-17 - and even make it look like the rebels did it.
An attached analysis for the American Political Science Association 2015.09.03 also supplies proof that circles close to the current Ukrainian was organized the shootings of their own protest-supporter at the Maidan square that lead to the regime-change in Ukraine. Killing people to blame it on the enemies – that could very well be part of their “method”.
Prime suspect of MH-17 was from the beginning is the Ukrainian military – not the rebels:
Circles
within the Ukrainian government have the motive and the means
and the demonstrated will to use criminal methods (ref. attached
document 2015.09.03) - to shoot down MH-17 in a way that could be used to blame
it on the rebels.
The two theories above must be judged against the evidence (and ‘evidence’, as some may be misdirected) presented by the official investigation of MH-17 delivered by the Dutch Safety Board on 2015.10.14.
Missile blast – one or two?
The Dutch Safety Board fails to give proof whether one or two missiles exploded. Radio recordings in the cockpit (fig. 9 p. 46) show two transient sounds. The second sound is identified as a missile blast few meters side-left-above of the cockpit – but the source of the first sound transient, which was recorded only by one of the 4 microphones, the Cockpit Area Microphone (CAM), is not explained by the Dutch Safety Board. This does not increase confidence in the work of the Dutch Safety Board.
Maybe the first sound was an explosion from another direction – from another source, another explosion more to the aft of the airplane. That possibility would better than given “missing microphone cap” wishy-washy explanation account for the fact that the first transient sound was only recorded by one microphone. The Dutch safety board also strangely fails to mention if or if not the remnants of MH-17 bear proof of a second hit by something.
Maybe the Dutch Safety Board already possesses evidence that no second missile hit the MH-17. It could also be that the first sound recorded in the cockpit pertained to the same source as the second sound. But it is not assuring that the Dutch Safety Board has suppressed the vital issue – two transients and according to their story only one blast.
If only a single missile blasted, this does not in itself prove either theory A or B, as similar missile warheads could come from a Buk missile and from a big air-to-air missile fired by the Ukrainian air force.
But a second missile would rule out Theory A above, and place heavy suspicion upon the Ukrainian air force. This omission could be a sign of politicized misdirection in the investigation.
The above failure of the Dutch Safety Board provokes doubts about their work.
Machine gun fire – yes or no?
The Dutch Safety Board fails sorely to check precisely whether machine gun from a military aircraft fire hit MH-17.
It is proven that the majority of holes in MH-17 come from a missile blast. But the Dutch Safety Board fails to inform the international public whether MH-17 was also attacked by machine gun fire before the missile hit.
Blast holes from missile can be mixing with and obscure other holes from 30 mm machine gun bullets. The Dutch Safety Board fails to investigate if bullet holes were between the blast-holes. Disturbing.
Machine gun ammunition could be of two kinds: Ordinary machine gun bullets would give rather neat round or elliptical holes. Other kinds of bullets blast and might even make holes looking like missile fragment holes. Fragmenting bullets will have left traces of bullet-fragments which the Dutch Safety Board have not considered. The Dutch Safety Board in appendix X sect. 4.9 claims that a Mig-29 machine gun should only carry 150-260 pieces of bullet-ammunition for close-combat. This may be true, though it seems highly improbable. However, the fact remains, that machine gun holes can be present without them having to be the reason for all the holes, as the Dutch Safety Board erroneously argues.
The failure of the Dutch Safety Board to recognize this aspect provokes uneasiness about their work.
Radar “story”
According to sect. 2.9.5 the Dutch Safety Board received no primary radar data, neither from Ukraine nor from Russia. The explanations given for this are not believable and probably due to military concerns. Video of primary radar screen was delivered from Russia only, but Russia claims not to have radar data from Ukrainian territory. This is of course untrue, but neither country wants to reveal too much about what they can see on radar. What raises suspicions is the lack of raw civilian radar data from Ukraine due to “scheduled” maintenance.
Only processed secondary radar data are provided. Importantly, secondary radar data depend on a transponder on the aircrafts to send out a signal. Military aircrafts always turn off their transponder before going into sensitive action – this way military aircraft become invisible on secondary radar. Everybody in aviation knows this. It is thought provoking that the Dutch Safety Board fail to point that fact out.
Ukraine has sent no primary radar data of video of primary radar screens. Russia claims not to have any radar data from Ukrainian territory – this may unbelievable, but fact remains that Russia has not sent such data. The sum of these inconsistent facts is that the Dutch Safety Board is not believable when they claim (sect. 2.9.5.2 ) that radar data “prove” that no military aircraft was within 30 km from the point where MH-17 ceased on the radar – because secondary radar does not always reveal military aircraft, and Russia’s primary radar for Ukrainian territory was allegedly not available, and Ukrainian radar was out for “scheduled maintenance”.
The Dutch Safety Board story about “proof” of no military airplane near MH-17 is not supported by their conflicting explanation about radar data.
The “radar-story” put together by the Dutch Safety Board is either untrue or needs better explanation.
Suppressed Facts about Missile Range
Air-to-air missiles (especially Russian types) fired from a military aircraft against MH-17 can have very long range – up to 200 km. The list of long-range air-to-air missiles in Table 14 p. 128 does not indicate their range. I have checked the relevant ranges, from unofficial sources (incl. Federation of American Scientists) and their ranges are from 30 km and upwards. Meaning they could more or less all have been fired from a position outside the radar screen.
The Dutch Safety Board makes us lose trust in their good will and objectivity when they fail to mention that air-to-air missiles could not have been fired upon MH-17 and instead claim “proof” of something which they must know themselves is not proven. Such an untrue statement could by less polite people be called a lie. On that background, the Dutch Safety Board’s omission in Table 14 of the range of the shown air-to-air missiles does not seem accidental, but political !
According to the Dutch Safety Board’s inconsistent “radar-story” (ref. above) no military aircraft was within 30-90 km of MH-17 when it fell down. But a heavy air-to-air missile with a warhead the same size and composition of a Buk, can very well have been fired beyond 30-90 km range (even 200 km away) from a Ukrainian military aircraft slightly above MH-17 to disguise its trajectory, homing in on radio emissions from the cockpit of MH-17. That would have been easy for a military !
Trajectory simulations
The Dutch Safety Board has made extensive trajectory simulations – fumbling with parameters until the computer gave the “right” results of a Buk coming from rebel controlled area. A horizontal analysis pointing to rebel area is delivered, but a vertical flight path is not delivered. This resulting picture of a possible flight path for a Buk missile may be true possibility – which is not a proof that it happened – or it may even be untrue.
The Dutch Safety Board gives no explanation as to WHY a missile they claim came from the ground, should hit MH-17 from above. It’s not logical.
There could be a natural explanation, that a missile from the ground explodes above, but it attracts doubts about the Dutch Safety Board that this logical aspect is not treated.
The Dutch Safety Board fails to deliver alternative computer simulations analyzing the many possible trajectories of an air-to-air missile with could carry a heavy fragmentation-type warhead with similar to a Buk missile. The Dutch Safety Board supplies only one simulation of an air-to-air missile - and it is clearly of the wrong type of air-to-air missile.
The Dutch Safety Board must have been aware that the air-to-air flight path simulation was of the wrong type – raising suspicion that it is a deliberate attempt at misinforming the public.
The trajectory analysis of the Dutch Safety Board is incomplete – it lacks explanation why a missile from the ground should explode above – and it attracts suspicion that air-to-air simulations are not carried out with the heavy long-range type of fragmentation air-to-air missile.
Butterfly Fragment Shapes
There is evidence that fragments from the missile that blasted close side-above MH-about 3 meters from to the captain’s position were “ferrous alloy” and had butterfly shapes (“bowtie” shapes they call it).
The Dutch Safety Board claims that no air-to-air missile has been available to the Ukrainian military with butterfly shape fragments. How do they know this? Have the Dutch Safety Board seriously tried to find all the kind of fragmentation types available to the R-33, R-37, and R-40 air-to-air missiles? (Table 14). I repeat my reference to a study from Australian Air Power from 2012.04: Russian made air-to-air missiles come in all types, sizes, distances, seeker systems, air-frames – and warheads ! Russians are smart – their air-to-air missiles are intelligently constructed as a Lego-system, where the operator can put together many different types of missile.
Seekers exist that would make such a Ukrainian air-to-air missile go directly against the frequencies of the weather-radar or radio close to the cockpit of the MH-17. An air-to-air missile from a Ukrainian attack aircraft could have been sent from above MH-17, that can explain why the missile exploded above the cockpit.
A military like Ukraine can even (maybe with help from a big outside nation) have made their own butterfly shaped (bowtype) fragments (like fig. 56 center+right, p. 132) and fitted onto a long-range air-to-air missile to make it simulate a hit from a Buk missile. The Dutch Safety Board is disturbingly shallow about their metal analysis of the fragments. To make a safe conclusion, the Dutch Safety Board should have analyze the exact fragment metal structure, its processing method, and precise chemical composition, and compared this to a Buk warhead – to check if all these match. A thorough metal analysis of the fragmentation pieces would have been easily possible – but was omitted. Strange. Before explosion, the layers of lose fragments around the warhead are bound together with a gel or glue. Remnants of glue chemicals on fragments should also be studied exactly and compared to an unexploded Buk warhead – but this procedure was also omitted.
The Dutch Safety Board fails here again.
Types of explosive
A mix of explosives were discovered on remnants of the MH-17 – ref. sect. 2.16.3 p. 93.
The Dutch Safety Board then goes on to say, that one of these explosives also is used in a Buk missile. That proves nothing. What about the other types?
The same different kinds of propellants and explosives are probably used in a wide range of missiles – also air-to-air missiles.
Also here, the Dutch Safety Board fails to deliver a thorough investigation.
Remnants of Buk missile found
The Dutch Safety Board presents that remnants of a Buk missile was found at one of the many sites of debris (p.81).
Many people have had access to these areas – not only war-tourists, but also members of Ukraine’s secret security services. If Ukrainian military circles have been cold-blooded enough to murder nearly 300 people on the MH-17, they will certainly also have had the will power and capacity to place remnants of a Buk missile at one of the many crash sites.
Blast proximity
Evidence shows that the missile blast came just a few meters from the captain’s cockpit window. What a coincidence – silencing the radio at once. And if machine guns were fired at the cockpit before the missile hit. their holes would be disguised by hundreds of missile fragment holes !
A Buk missile has a radar proximity fuse. According to unofficial sources, a Buk missile is set to blast already at a distance of 17 meters – not just a few meters. There could be a logical explanation, but it creates uneasiness that the Dutch Safety Board fails to deal with this issue.
If someone deliberately sent an air-to-air missile to down MH-17, they could very well in advance have adjusted the proximity from to make a “close-hit” – much less than the 17 meters to silence the cockpit crew and their radio instantaneously.
This problem is suppressed by the Dutch Safety Board.
Missing parts of the wreck?
The Preliminary crash report p.22 shows some of the parts of MH-17 recovered which are not accounted for in the final report p.55. For example, p.22 in the preliminary report shows a piece left above the cockpit which seems to be missing on p.55 of the final report. Inconsistencies also seem to exist between photos of wreck parts and p. 55 in the final report. Disturbing.
This detracts from credibility of the Dutch Safety Board – are they showing all?
Paint
Paint remnants have been recovered from debris. These paint remnants are of same color and layer composition as the remnants of a Buk missile found within the crash area (p. 95, top). This is very important.
This would normally have been a conclusive proof of a Buk missile – according to theory A above.
Maybe due to lack of competence, maybe because they lack faith in their analysis of the paint, the Dutch Safety Board fails to stress what could otherwise have been their only really convincing proof of their conclusion, of which they are so certain that they even made a computer-video about it on their homepage.
Does the Dutch Safety Board realize themselves, that the paint analysis p. 95 (if it holds) it their only conclusive evidence?
In view of all above inconsistencies, suppression of information, and indications which justify fear of a political pressure to manipulate the investigation carried out by the Dutch Safety Board – there is even doubt about the paint as a proof. It must be followed up – checked and confirmed or negated.
The Dutch have done their work now – some for good and some for not quite so good.
The EU must get involved now – conclude the final investigation of MH-17.
Shame or no shame on the Netherlands
I take credit that due to my sharp complaint 2015.09.14, the investigation into the crash of MH-17 is much more thorough, taking more issues, aspects and weapon types into consideration, than it would most probably otherwise have been.
In
my mail 2014.09.14, I cast shame on the Netherlands for mocking victims and the
public with a politicized investigation - hiding facts. From the above it is
clear, that the investigation of the Netherlands still suppresses issues
which cast doubt on their conclusion. This does not clear the Netherlands that
the investigation is politicized to yield certain “results”.
EU MUST INVESTIGATE - MH 17
As part of an EU investigation, the full 30 min. of cockpit inboard and radio recordings must be publicized. Things of great importance can have happened much earlier than before the last few minutes, like for instance inconsistencies in why the Tower adjusted their flight path (“due to weather”) or sightings or communication regarding military aircrafts while under way.
EU MUST INVESTIGATE - MH 17
As part of an EU investigation, the full 30 min. of cockpit inboard and radio recordings must be publicized. Things of great importance can have happened much earlier than before the last few minutes, like for instance inconsistencies in why the Tower adjusted their flight path (“due to weather”) or sightings or communication regarding military aircrafts while under way.
Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
