Tuesday, December 12, 2017

Solution








30 October 2017

Political solution with Russia on its way

By: Karsten Riise

A political solution with Russia is on its way – Europe must rethink security


Only a political solution with Russia is possible

While some European countries (like Denmark) speak confrontation and buy military for billions, high energy is at work to create a western political solution with Russia.

A good indication of this came in September 2017, from the influential International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), headquartered in London. It was written by Michael O'Hanlon, Foreign Policy Research Director at the Brookings Institute, one of America's most influential foreign policy think-tanks.

The proposal for a solution with Russia must thus be assumed to be a political initiative with solid support among key leaders in the US-NATO. It is in line with several announcements from other influential foreign policy thinkers in the USA, including Henry Kissinger, Prof. Mearsheimer and Prof. Walt, and the CATO Institute (with strong business relationships), who all support President Trump in the desire for a more constructive US policy with Russia (see my analysis 12 January 2017, below).


What could a western agreement with Russia look like?

The IISS and Brookings Institute propose a new East European Security Architecture (EESA) with Russia, with the following main points:
  1. Stop for western sanctions against Russia – stop for tensions and provocative military exercises and maneuvers on both sides.
  2. Acceptance that Crimea “due to is unusual history” and “as an experience not to be repeated” - is now part of Russia.

    A formal western recognition of Crimea’s new status is perhaps not politically possible in the USA. As the second best solution, IISS and Brookings Institute propose that the issue of Crimea is simply by-passed by the west: No official recognition and cooperation on Crimea, but on the other hand no western sanctions against Russia because of Crimea. If symbolic western sanctions must continue (due to internal western political circumstances), future ”Russia-sanctions” should deliberately be designed to be without real effects – but even this is not recommended by IISS and Brookings Institute.
  3. Stop for NATO-expansions. Expansion of NATO is now by key-persons in the West recognized as a problem: NATO-expansion is a security-political own-goal.

    Sweden, Finland, Kosovo, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia should remain neutral. NATO’s promise from 2008 of membership for Ukraine and Georgia should be taken back, reneged. Countries have a legal right to choose many things, but no country has any legal ”right” to become a NATO member.

    An East European Security Architecture (EESA) will bring more security faster for neutral countries, than bad promises about a NATO membership, which will either not be forthcoming, or (even worse) will be false, because large NATO-countries will in practice not be willing to honor the security-commitment (ref. NATO Article V).
  4. NATO cooperation with other countries is still envisaged, for instance with new Membership Action Plans (MAPs).
  5. EU membership should be distinguished from so-called ”EU-security-membership”.

    Not all EU countries will be fully integrated in the growing EU security structure and the security provisions of the EU Treaty - for instance if the Ukraine and Georgia should (one distant day) become members of the EU.
  6. No NATO military build-up in the Baltic countries.

    Nothing more than a minimally increased ”tripwire-force”, maybe a ”few thousand” above 5,000 NATO soldiers, including the stationing of one US brigade. Not a force able to stop an invasion. This suggestion of an only minimally increased force level in the Baltic countries is probably just a negotiable starting-position towards Russia, a point which NATO may discuss and moderate.
  7. Solution of regional disagreements with Russia.

    East-Ukraine should be solved according to the Minsk II agreement with local self-determination and withdrawal of Russian military forces. In Georgia, a corresponding agreement could be made for the Russian controlled areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  8. Very limited western military supplies to ”neutral” countries in Russia’s periphery.

    No significant western arms supplies for Ukraine and Georgia. No fixed weapons-limits, but a written ”understanding” on this issue. The proposal from IISS and Brookings Institute mentions the precedence of the US-China agreement from 1982 to cap (and gradually reduce) US arms sales to Taiwan – an agreement which has worked well, in spite of some expected disagreements between USA-China. The USA-China agreement still works today, after 35 years.
  9. Implementation of a control-system for military presence in the periphery of Russia.
  10. No legally binding treaty with Russia – but a written understanding.

    A legally binding treaty cannot expect to be approved by the United States Congress. Instead, a written agreement between the parties in style and spirit of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 can be effective in practice without being legally binding. Although the Helsinki Accords were criticized (by hard-liners) in the West at the time, this arrangement actually came to function well as a practical basis for East-West cooperation and development a long time after.

    Countries between NATO and Russia should preferably also be signatories to such an agreement – but this is not ”needed”.


The above is a cautious outline – a first accommodating suggestion from the western side. Russia is doing fine. Given global strategic facts in Russia’s favor, the final result will most surely be better for Russia.

Russia needs guarantees for Kaliningrad, a guaranteed low military NATO level in the Baltic countries, and political influence in the Ukraine. The Ukraine has strong historic-cultural ties with Russia – can the Ukraine serve as a “bridge” between East and West (in Henry Kissinger’s words)? Russia also needs safeguards for its interests in the whole Caucasus region (including Georgia). Caucasus is not only a sensitive Russian security zone, but serves also as a vital corridor for Russian influence and friendship in relation to Turkey, Iran, Syria and the Middle East.

All these issues can be solved and will be solved. The West needs Russia and vice-versa. None of the parties West-Russia have interest in the current tensions, or risks of a European war.


European countries must chart the right course – or fall behind

Leading EU countries Germany, France, Italy and Spain, as well as the USA (with President Trump), do not want to bind a big force in the Baltic countries for the next 30 years, like the USA has done in South Korea. A big standing force in the Baltic countries will be very difficult support anyway, and will therefore even be at risk, should a conflict arise.

Nobody in Europe wants to risk their own prime-forces and hence their homeland for an indefensible protrusion of land (sorry for this straight-forward expression), which in some eyes even might better have remained neutral. Most importantly, Germans have had enough of war-destruction, and will not want this at all. The Baltic countries must also themselves be helpful in creating a prosperous relationship with Russia: After all, since 1945, Finland has proved that this is possible. The largest EU countries want cooperation, not war - with Russia.

With their recent Cold War attitude, some smaller countries like Denmark run the risk of ending up on the “losing side” after a new European security agreement. Once a western agreement is achieved between leading EU-countries and Russia, business will start up again, and Russia has an enormous market potential. Cold-war countries like Denmark run the risk of being put ”back of the queue”, once the West again opens up for billion-mega-deals with Russia.

Germany and Poland already have sufficient heavy forces to secure themselves and Central-Europe. According to open sources (Wikipedia), Russia has 100 4th latest generation main battle tanks (Armata) and 800 modern 3rd generation main battle tanks, to defend its enormous territory from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. Poland, for its territory alone, has 481 modern main battle tanks 3rd generation, and Germany 432 of the very most effective 4th generation Leopard 2A7+ main battle tanks, with additionally 38 more 4th generation Leopard 2A7+ tanks shared between Germany and the Netherlands. This NATO balance is basically enough for a defensive force – especially given all the other NATO assets.

Some force modernization is needed in NATO. But given the great-political development, it would be a complete lack of brains, if small countries like Denmark invest in building up heavy military units, which due to their nature even are strategically difficult to move quickly over considerable distances, and which will be too one-sided for use in totally different kinds of conflicts in other places of the Earth.

A European military modernization is needed, but additional heavy units in countries like Denmark will be of the wrong kind - they would not even constitute the proverbial ”security insurance policy”, because they are too difficult to bring to the front (Baltic) in a timely manner to influence a quick development. And any protracted (attrition) war with Russia, putting all Europe at risk, will be totally out of the question anyway - Russia is a nuclear power.


Different security thinking needed

Conflicts must be avoided and solved with integrated political-social-economic-military thinking.

This calls for totally different kinds of approaches. The experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya has been absolutely disappointing (to put it mildly). And the emergence of extreme situations in Syria was probably only possible because the West for too long made the big mistake to use this as a way to pressure a government, they did not like.

Africa is becoming a continent of 2 billion people – they need jobs, city-jobs with exports.

The global security picture calls for absolutely new concepts.



Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


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